

## EDITORS' NOTE

### METAPSYCHOLOGISCHE ERGÄNZUNG ZUR TRAUMLEHRE

#### GERMAN EDITIONS

- 1916–17 *Int. Z. ärztl. Psychoan.*, 4 (6), 277–87.  
1918 *SKSN*, 4, 339–55. (1922, 2nd ed.)  
1924 *GS*, 5, 520–34.  
1924 *Technik und Metapsychol.*, 242–56.  
1931 *Theoretische Schriften*, 141–56.  
1946 *GW*, 10, 412–26.  
1975 *SA*, 3, 179–91. (Revised reprint of the *GW* edition.)

[219]

#### ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

- ‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’  
1925 *CP*, 4, 137–51. (Tr. C. M. Baines.)  
1957 *SE*, 14, 222–35. (Tr. J. Strachey, based on the 1925 version.)  
1984 *PFL*, 11, 229–43. (Reprint of the *SE* version.)

The present translation is a revised and corrected reprint of the *SE* version.

This paper, together with the next one (‘Mourning and Melancholia’), seems to have been written over a period of eleven days between April 23 and May 4, 1915. It was not published until two years later. As its title implies, it is essentially an application of Freud’s newly stated theoretical scheme to the hypotheses put forward in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. But it resolves itself largely into a discussion of the effects produced by the state of sleep on the different ‘systems’ of the mind. And this discussion in turn is mainly concentrated on the problem of hallucination and on an investigation of how it is that in our normal state we are able to distinguish between phantasy and reality.

Freud had been occupied by this problem from early times. Much space was devoted to it in his ‘Project’ of 1895 (Freud, 1950a, especially in Part I, Sections 15 and 16, and in Part III, Section 1). And the solution he proposed for it there, though stated in a different terminology, visibly resembles the one put forward in the present paper. It included two main lines of thought. Freud argued that the ‘primary psychical processes’ do not by themselves make any distinction between an idea and a perception; they need, in the first place, to be inhibited by the ‘secondary psychical

[220]

processes', and these can only come into operation where there is an 'ego' with a large enough store of cathexis to provide the energy necessary to put the inhibition into effect. The aim of the inhibition is to give time for 'indications of reality' to arrive from the perceptual apparatus. But, in the second place, besides this inhibiting and delaying function, the ego is also responsible for directing cathexes of 'attention' (see above, p. 169 and *n.* 3) on to the external world, without which the indications of reality could not be observed.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *RSE*, 5, 506 ff. and 536 ff., the function of inhibition and delay was again insisted upon as an essential factor in the process of judging whether or not things are real and was once more attributed to the 'secondary process', though the ego was no longer mentioned as such. Freud's next serious discussion of the subject was in his paper on 'The Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911b), *ibid.*, 12, where for the first time he used the actual term 'reality-testing'. Here again the delaying feature of the process was emphasized, but the function of attention now came in for further notice. It was described as a periodic examination of the external world and was related particularly to the sense organs and to consciousness. This last side of the problem, the part played by the systems *Pcpt.* and *Cs.*, is the one which is chiefly discussed in the paper which follows.

But Freud's interest in the subject was by no means exhausted by the present discussion. In *Group Psychology* (1921c), for instance, he attributed the work of reality-testing to the ego ideal (*ibid.*, 18, 106) – an attribution which, however, he withdrew very soon afterwards, in a footnote at the beginning of Chapter III of *The Ego and the Id* (1923b), *ibid.*, 19, 24 *n.* 2. And now for the first time since the early days of the 'Project' reality-testing was definitely ascribed to the ego. In a still later and particularly interesting discussion of the subject in the paper on 'Negation' (1925h), *ibid.*, 19, reality-testing was shown to depend on the ego's close genetic relation with the instruments of sense perception. In that paper, too (as well as at the end of the almost contemporary paper on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad', 1925a; *ibid.*, 19), there were further references to the ego's habit of sending out periodic exploratory cathexes into the external world – evidently an allusion in different terms to what had originally been described as 'attention'. But in 'Negation' Freud carried his analysis of reality-testing further, and traced the whole course of its development back to the individual's earliest object relations.

Freud's increasing interest in ego psychology in his later years led him to a closer examination of the relations of the ego to the external world. In two short papers (1924b) and (1924e), *ibid.*, 19, published soon after *The Ego and the Id*, he discussed the distinction between the ego's relation to reality in neuroses and psychoses. And in a paper on 'Fetishism' (1927e), *ibid.*, 21, he gave his first detailed account of a method of defence by the ego – '*Verleugnung*' ('disavowal' or 'denial') – which had not previously been clearly differentiated from repression and which described the ego's reaction to an intolerable external reality. This theme was developed still further in some of Freud's very latest writings, particularly in Chapter VIII of the posthumous *Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940a [1938]), *ibid.*, 23.

A METAPSYCHOLOGICAL  
SUPPLEMENT TO  
THE THEORY OF DREAMS<sup>1</sup>

We shall discover in various connections how much our enquiries benefit if certain states and phenomena which may be regarded as *normal prototypes* of pathological affections are brought up for purposes of comparison. Among these we may include such affective states as grief and being in love, as well as the state of sleep and the phenomenon of dreaming.

[222]

We are not in the habit of devoting much thought to the fact that every night human beings lay aside the wrappings in which they have enveloped their skin, as well as anything which they may use as a supplement to their bodily organs (so far as they have succeeded in making good those organs' deficiencies by substitutes), for instance, their spectacles, their false hair and teeth, and so on. We may add that when they go to sleep they carry out an entirely analogous undressing of their minds and lay aside most of their psychical acquisitions. Thus on both counts they approach remarkably close to the situation in which they began life. Somatically, sleep is a reactivation of intrauterine existence, fulfilling as it does the conditions of repose, warmth and exclusion of stimulus; indeed, in sleep many people resume the foetal posture. The psychical state of a sleeping person is characterized by an almost complete withdrawal from the surrounding world and a cessation of all interest in it.

In investigating psychoneurotic states, we find ourselves led to emphasize in each of them what are known as *temporal regressions*, i.e. the amount of developmental recession peculiar to it. We distinguish two such regressions – one affecting the development of the ego [*Ich*]<sup>T</sup> and the other that of the libido. In the state of sleep, the latter is carried to the

<sup>1</sup> This paper and the following one are derived from a collection which I originally intended to publish in book form under the title *Zur Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie* [Preliminaries to a Metapsychology]. They follow on some papers which were printed in Volume III of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* ('Drives and their Vicissitudes', 'Repression' and 'The Unconscious'). The intention of the series is to clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on which a psychoanalytic system could be founded. [See p. 93 above.]

[223] point of restoring primitive narcissism, while the former goes back to the stage of hallucinatory satisfaction of wishes. [Cf. below, p. 202.]

It is, of course, the study of dreams which has taught us what we know of the psychical characteristics of the state of sleep. It is true that dreams only show us the dreamer *insofar* as he is *not* sleeping; nevertheless they are bound to reveal at the same time characteristics of sleep itself. We have come to know from observation some peculiarities of dreams which we could not at first understand, but which we can now fit into the picture without difficulty. Thus, we know that dreams are completely egoistic<sup>1</sup> [*egoistisch*] and that the person who plays the chief part in their scenes is always to be recognized as the dreamer. This is now easily to be accounted for by the narcissism of the state of sleep. Narcissism and egoism, indeed, coincide; the word 'narcissism' is only intended to emphasize the fact that egoism is a libidinal phenomenon as well; or, to put it *another* way, narcissism may be described as the libidinal complement of egoism.<sup>2</sup> The 'diagnostic' capacity of dreams – a phenomenon which is generally acknowledged, but regarded as puzzling – becomes equally comprehensible, too. In dreams, incipient physical disease is often detected earlier and more clearly than in waking life, and all the current bodily sensations assume gigantic proportions.<sup>3</sup> This magnification is hypochondriacal in character; it is conditional upon the withdrawal of all psychical cathexes [*Besetzung*]<sup>T</sup> from the external world back on to the ego, and it makes possible early recognition of bodily changes which in waking life would still for a time have remained unobserved.

*Abwehr*

A dream tells us that something was going on which tended to interrupt sleep, and it enables us to understand in what way it has been possible to fend off [*abgewehrt*]<sup>T</sup> this interruption. The final outcome is that the sleeper has dreamt and is able to go on sleeping; the internal demand which was striving to occupy him has been replaced by an external experience, whose demand has been disposed of. A dream is, therefore, among other things, a *projection*: an externalization of an internal process. We may recall that we have already met with projection elsewhere among the means adopted for defence [*Abwehr*]. The mechanism of a hysterical phobia, too, culminates in the fact that the subject is able to protect himself by attempts at flight against an external danger which has

[224]

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chapter V (D); *RSE*, 4, 237 ff. See, however, the addition made in 1925 to a footnote, *ibid.*, 4, 240 *n. 2*.]

<sup>2</sup> [A longer discussion of the relation between narcissism and egoism *can* be found in Lecture XXVI of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17a), *ibid.*, 16.]

<sup>3</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *ibid.*, 4, 3 and 30–1.]

taken the place of an internal drive demand [*Triebanspruches*]<sup>T</sup>.<sup>1</sup> We will, however, defer the full treatment of projection till we come to analyse the narcissistic disorder in which this mechanism plays the most striking part.<sup>2</sup>

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In what way, however, can a case arise in which the intention to sleep meets with an interruption? The interruption may proceed from an internal excitation [*Erregung*]<sup>T</sup> or from an external stimulus. Let us first consider the more obscure and more interesting case of interruption from within. Observation shows that dreams are instigated by residues from the previous day – thought cathexes [*Denkbesetzungen*] which have not submitted to the general withdrawal of cathexes, but have retained in spite of it a certain amount of libidinal or other interest.<sup>3</sup> Thus the narcissism of sleep has from the outset had to admit an exception at this point, and it is here that the formation of dreams takes its start. In analysis we make the acquaintance of these ‘day’s residues’ in the shape of latent dream thoughts; and, both by reason of their nature and of the whole situation, we must regard them as preconscious ideas [*Vorstellungen*]<sup>T</sup>, as belonging to the system *Pcs.*

We cannot proceed any further in explaining the formation of dreams till we have overcome certain difficulties. The narcissism of the state of sleep implies a withdrawal of cathexis from all ideas of objects [*Objektvorstellungen*], from both the unconscious and the preconscious portions of those ideas. If, then, certain day’s residues have retained their cathexis, we hesitate to suppose that they have acquired at night so much energy as to compel notice on the part of consciousness; we should be more inclined to suppose that the cathexis they have retained is far weaker than that which they possessed during the day. Here analysis saves us further speculation, for it shows that these day’s residues must receive a reinforcement which has its source in unconscious drive impulses [*Triebregungen*]<sup>T</sup> if they are to figure as constructors of dreams. This hypothesis presents no immediate difficulties, for we have every reason to suppose that in sleep the censorship between the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.* is greatly reduced, so that communication between the two systems is made easier.<sup>4</sup>

Erregung

[225]

But there is another doubt, which we must not pass over in silence. If the narcissistic state of sleep has resulted in a drawing in of all the

<sup>1</sup> [See the paper on ‘The Unconscious’, above, p. 161 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> [A possible reference to a missing paper on paranoia (p. 93 ff. above).]

<sup>3</sup> [For this and the following paragraph see *The Interpretation of Dreams*, RSE, 5, 495 f.]

<sup>4</sup> [Ibid., 5, 470.]

cathexes of the systems *Ucs.* and *Pcs.*, then there can no longer be any possibility of the preconscious day's residues being reinforced by unconscious drive impulses, seeing that these themselves have surrendered their cathexes to the ego. Here the theory of dream formation ends up in a contradiction, unless we can rescue it by introducing a modification into our assumption about the narcissism of sleep.

A restrictive modification of this kind is, as we shall discover later,<sup>1</sup> necessary in the theory of dementia praecox as well. This must be to the effect that the repressed portion of the system *Ucs.* does not comply with the wish to sleep that comes from the ego, that it retains its cathexis in whole or in part, and that in general, in consequence of repression, it has acquired a certain measure of independence of the ego. Accordingly, too, some amount of the expenditure on repression (anticathexis) would have to be maintained throughout the night, in order to meet the drive danger – though the inaccessibility of all paths leading to a release of affect and to motility may considerably diminish the height of the anti-cathexis that is necessary.<sup>2</sup> Thus we should picture the situation which leads to the formation of dreams as follows. The wish to sleep endeavours to draw in all the cathexes sent out by the ego and to establish an absolute narcissism. This can only partly succeed, for what is repressed in the system *Ucs.* does not obey the wish to sleep. A part of the anti-cathexes has therefore to be maintained, and the censorship between the *Ucs.* and the *Pcs.* must remain, even if not at its full strength. So far as the dominance of the ego extends, all the systems are emptied of cathexes. The stronger the *Ucs.* drive cathexes are, the more unstable is sleep. We are acquainted, too, with the extreme case where the ego gives up the wish to sleep, because it feels unable to inhibit the repressed impulses set free during sleep – in other words, where it renounces sleep because of its fear of its dreams.<sup>3</sup>

[226]

Later on we shall learn<sup>4</sup> to recognize the momentous nature of this hypothesis regarding the unruliness of repressed impulses. For the present let us follow out the situation which occurs in dream formation.

The possibility mentioned above [p. 199] – that some of the preconscious thoughts of the day may also prove resistant and retain a part of

1 [It is not clear what this refers to.]

2 [RSE, 5, 507–8. See also above, p. 134.]

3 [RSE, 5, 519.]

4 [The reference is again not clear.]

their cathexis – must be recognized as a second breach in narcissism.<sup>1</sup> At bottom, the two cases may be identical. The resistance of the day's residues may originate in a link with unconscious impulses which is already in existence during waking life; or the process may be somewhat less simple, and the day's residues which have not been wholly emptied of cathexis may establish a connection with the repressed material only after the state of sleep has set in, thanks to the easing of communication between the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.* In both cases there follows the same decisive step in dream formation: the preconscious dream wish is formed, which gives expression to the unconscious impulse in the material of the preconscious day's residues. This dream wish must be sharply distinguished from the day's residues; it need not have existed in waking life and it may already display the irrational character possessed by everything that is unconscious when we translate it into the conscious. Again, the dream wish must not be confused with the wishful impulses which may have been present, though they certainly need not necessarily be present, among the preconscious (latent) dream thoughts. If, however, there were any such preconscious wishes, the dream wish associates itself with them, as a most effective reinforcement of them.

We have now to consider the further vicissitudes [*Schicksale*]<sup>T</sup> undergone by this wishful impulse, which in its essence represents an unconscious drive demand and which has been formed in the *Pcs.* as a dream wish (a wish-fulfilling phantasy [*Phantasie*]<sup>T</sup>). Reflection tells us that this wishful impulse may be dealt with along three different paths. It may follow the path that would be normal in waking life, by pressing from the *Pcs.* to consciousness; or it may by-pass the *Cs.* and find direct motor discharge [*Abfuhr*]<sup>T</sup>; or it may take the unexpected path which observation enables us in fact to trace. In the first case, it would become a *delusion* having as content the fulfilment of the wish; but in the state of sleep this never happens. With our scanty knowledge of the metapsychological conditions of mental [*seelischen*]<sup>T</sup> processes, we may perhaps take this fact as a hint that a complete emptying of a system renders it little susceptible to instigation. The second case, that of direct motor discharge, should be excluded by the same principle;<sup>2</sup> for access

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[227]

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<sup>1</sup> [The first being the 'unruliness of repressed impulses'.]

<sup>2</sup> [The 'principle of the insusceptibility to excitation of uncatheted systems' (below, p. 208 *n.* 3) seems to be alluded to in one or two passages in Freud's later writings, e.g. in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920g), *RSE*, 18, 30, and in the paper on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad' (1925a), *ibid.*, 19, 230 *f.* But the principle is already foreshadowed in neurological terms in Freud's 1895 'Project' (1950a). In Part I, Section II, of that work he lays it down that a quantity 'passes more easily from a neuron to a catheted neuron than to an uncatheted one'; *ibid.*, 1, 344. And in Section 20 he actually applies this hypothesis to the very problem of motor discharge in dreams which is the subject of

to motility normally lies yet another step beyond the censorship of consciousness. But we do meet with exceptional instances in which this happens, in the form of *somnambulism*. We do not know what conditions make this possible, or why it does not happen more often. What actually happens in dream formation is a very remarkable and quite unforeseen turn of events. The process, begun in the *Pcs.* and reinforced by the *Ucs.*, pursues a backward course, through the *Ucs.* to perception, which is pressing upon consciousness. This *regression* is the third phase of dream formation. For the sake of clarity, we will repeat the two earlier ones: the reinforcement of the *Pcs.* day's residues by the *Ucs.*, and the setting up of the dream wish.

We call this kind of regression a *topographical* one, to distinguish it from the previously mentioned [p. 197 f. above] *temporal* or developmental regression.<sup>1</sup> The two do not necessarily always coincide, but they do so in the particular example before us. The reversal of the course of the excitation from the *Pcs.* through the *Ucs.* to perception is at the same time a return to the early stage of hallucinatory wish fulfilment.

[228]

We have already in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [RSE, 5, 484 ff.] described the way in which the regression of the preconscious day's residues takes place in dream formation. In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word presentations [*Wortvorstellungen*] are taken back to the thing presentations [*Sachvorstellungen*] which correspond to them, as if, in general, the process were dominated by considerations of *representability* [ibid., 5, 489 f.]. When regression has been completed, a number of cathexes are left over in the system *Ucs.* – cathexes of memories of *things*. The primary psychical process is brought to bear on these memories, till, by condensation [*Verdichtung*]<sup>T</sup> of them and displacement [*Verschiebung*]<sup>T</sup> between their respective cathexes, it has shaped the manifest dream content. Only where the word presentations occurring in the day's residues are recent and current residues of *perceptions*, and not the expression of *thoughts*, are they themselves treated like

the present passage. He writes: 'Dreams are devoid of motor discharge and, for the most part, of motor elements. We are paralysed in dreams. The easiest explanation of this characteristic is the absence of spinal precathexis . . .' Since the neurons are uncathetised, 'the motor excitation cannot pass over the barrier . . .'; ibid., 1, 363. A few paragraphs later on he discusses the 'retrogressive' nature of the hallucinatory characteristic of dreams, as he does in the later part of the present passage.]

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. a paragraph added in 1914 to Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), RSE, 5, 490 (in which three kinds of regression are distinguished), and another discussion of regression near the beginning of Lecture XXII of the *Introductory Lectures* (1916–17a), ibid., 16, 299 ff. See also Appendix A of the 'Project', ibid., 1, 369 ff.]

thing presentations, and subjected to the influence of condensation and displacement. Hence the rule laid down in *The Interpretation of Dreams* [RSE, 5, 373 ff.], and since confirmed beyond all doubt, that words and speeches in the dream content are not freshly formed, but are modelled on speeches from the day preceding the dream (or on some other recent impressions, such as something that has been read). It is very noteworthy how little the dream-work keeps to the word presentations; it is always ready to exchange one word for another till it finds the expression which is most handy for plastic representation.<sup>1</sup>

Now it is in this respect that the essential difference between the dream-work and schizophrenia becomes clear. In the latter, what becomes the subject of modification by the primary process are the words themselves in which the preconscious thought was expressed; in dreams, what are subject to this modification are not the words, but the thing presentations to which the words have been taken back.<sup>2</sup> In dreams there is a topographical regression; in schizophrenia there is not. In dreams there is free communication between (*Pcs.*) word cathexes and (*Ucs.*) thing cathexes, while it is characteristic of schizophrenia that this communication is cut off. The impression this difference makes on one is lessened precisely by the dream interpretations we carry out in psychoanalytic practice. For, owing to the fact that dream interpretation traces the course taken by the dream-work, follows the paths which lead from the latent thoughts to the dream elements, reveals the way in which verbal ambiguities have been exploited, and points out the verbal bridges between different groups of material – owing to all this, we get an impression now of a joke, now of schizophrenia, and are apt to forget that for a dream all operations with words are no more than a preparation for a regression to things.

[229]

<sup>1</sup> I also ascribe to considerations of representability the fact which is insisted on and perhaps overestimated by Silberer [1914] that some dreams admit of two simultaneous, and yet essentially different interpretations [*Deutungen*]<sup>1</sup>, one of which he calls the ‘analytic’ and the other the ‘anagogic’. When this happens, we are invariably concerned with thoughts of a very abstract nature, which must have made their representation in the dream very difficult. We might compare it with the problem of representing in pictures a leading article from a political newspaper. In such cases, the dream-work must first replace the text that consists of abstract thoughts by one more concrete, connected with the former in some way – by comparison, symbolism, allegorical allusion, or best of all, genetically [*genetisch*]<sup>1</sup> – so that the more concrete text then takes the place of the abstract one as material for the dream-work. The abstract thoughts yield the so-called anagogic interpretation, which, in our interpretative work, we discover more easily than the true analytic one. Otto Rank has justly remarked that certain dreams about their treatment, dreamt by patients in analysis, are the best models on which to form a view of these dreams which admit of more than one interpretation. [Freud added a paragraph on anagogic interpretations in 1919 to *The Interpretation of Dreams*, RSE, 5, 468–9. See also ‘Dreams and Telepathy’ (1922a), *ibid.*, 18, 206 f.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. ‘The Unconscious’ (p. 175 above).]

The completion of the dream process consists in the thought content – regressively transformed and worked over into a wishful phantasy – becoming conscious as a sense perception; while this is happening it undergoes secondary revision, to which every perceptual concept is subject. The dream wish, as we say, is *hallucinated*, and, as a hallucination, meets with belief in the reality of its fulfilment. It is precisely round this concluding piece in the formation of dreams that the gravest uncertainties centre, and it is in order to clear them up that we are proposing to compare dreams with pathological states akin to them.

[230] The formation of the wishful phantasy and its regression to hallucination are the most essential parts of the dream-work, but they do not belong exclusively to dreams. They are also found in two morbid states: in acute hallucinatory confusion (Meynert's 'amentia'),<sup>1</sup> and in the hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia. The hallucinatory delirium of amentia is a clearly recognizable wishful phantasy, often completely well ordered like a perfect daydream. One might speak quite generally of a 'hallucinatory wishful psychosis', and attribute it equally to dreams and amentia. There are even dreams which consist of nothing but undistorted wishful phantasies with a very rich content.<sup>2</sup> The hallucinatory phase of schizophrenia has been less thoroughly studied; it seems as a rule to be of a composite nature, but in its essence it might well correspond to a fresh attempt at restitution, designed to restore a libidinal cathexis to the ideas of objects [*Objektvorstellungen*].<sup>3</sup> I cannot extend the comparison to the other hallucinatory states in various pathological disorders, because in their case I have no experience of my own upon which to draw, and cannot utilize that of other observers.

Let us be clear that the hallucinatory wishful psychosis – in dreams or elsewhere – achieves two by no means identical results. It not only brings hidden or repressed wishes into consciousness; it also represents them, with the subject's entire belief, as fulfilled. The concurrence of these two results calls for explanation. It is quite impossible to maintain that unconscious wishes must necessarily be taken for realities when once they have become conscious; for, as we know, our judgement is very well able to distinguish realities from ideas and wishes, however intense they may be. On the other hand, it seems justifiable to assume that belief in reality is bound up with perception through the senses. When once a

<sup>1</sup> [In the rest of this paper the term 'amentia' should be understood as referring to this condition.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), RSE, 4, 117 n. 1.]

<sup>3</sup> In the paper on 'The Unconscious' [see pp. 179–80 above] we recognized the hypercathexis of word presentations as a first attempt of this kind.

thought has followed the path to regression as far back as to the unconscious memory traces of objects and thence to perception, we accept the perception of it as real.<sup>1</sup> So hallucination brings belief in reality with it. We now have to ask ourselves what determines the coming into being of a hallucination. The first answer would be regression, and this would replace the problem of the origin of hallucination by that of the mechanism of regression. As regards dreams, this latter problem need not remain long unanswered. Regression of *Pcs.* dream thoughts to mnemic images of things [*Sacherinnerungsbildern*] is clearly the result of the attraction which the *Ucs. drive* representatives – e.g. repressed memories of experiences – exercise upon the thoughts which have been put into words.<sup>2</sup> But we soon perceive that we are on a false scent. If the secret of hallucination is nothing else than that of regression, every regression of sufficient intensity would produce hallucination with belief in its reality. But we are quite familiar with situations in which a process of regressive reflection brings to consciousness very clear visual mnemic images, though we do not on that account for a single moment take them for real perceptions. Again, we could very well imagine the dream-work penetrating to mnemic images of this kind, making conscious to us what was previously unconscious, and holding up to us a wishful phantasy which rouses our longing, but which we should not regard as a real fulfilment of the wish. Hallucination must therefore be something more than the regressive revival of mnemic images that are in themselves *Ucs.*

[231]

Let us, furthermore, bear in mind the great practical importance of distinguishing perceptions from ideas, however intensely recalled. Our whole relation to the external world, to reality, depends on our ability to do so. We have put forward the fiction<sup>3</sup> that we did not always possess this ability and that at the beginning of our mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it. But in such a situation satisfaction did not occur, and this failure must very soon have moved us to create some contrivance with the help of which it was possible to distinguish such wishful perceptions from a real fulfilment and to avoid them for the future. In other words, we gave up hallucinatory satisfaction of our wishes at a very early period and set up a kind of ‘reality-testing’.<sup>4</sup> The question now arises in what this reality-testing

<sup>1</sup> [This point was made by Breuer in his theoretical contribution to *Studies on Hysteria* (1895d), *RSE*, 2, 168 and *n*. He seems to attribute the idea to Meynert.]

<sup>2</sup> [*The Interpretation of Dreams*, *ibid.*, 5, 486 f.]

<sup>3</sup> [See Chapter VII (C) of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *ibid.*, 5, 505 ff.]

<sup>4</sup> [See Editors’ Note, p. 196 above.]

consisted, and how the hallucinatory wishful psychosis of dreams and amentia and similar conditions succeeds in abolishing it and in re-establishing the old mode of satisfaction.

[232]

The answer can be given if we now proceed to define more precisely the third of our psychical systems, the system *Cs.*, which hitherto we have not sharply distinguished from the *Pcs.* In *The Interpretation of Dreams*<sup>1</sup> we were already led to a decision to regard conscious perception as the function of a special system, to which we ascribed certain curious properties, and to which we shall now have good grounds for attributing other characteristics as well. We may regard this system, which is there called the *Pcpt.*, as coinciding with the system *Cs.*, on whose activity becoming conscious usually depends.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, even so, the fact of a thing's becoming conscious still does not wholly coincide with its belonging to a system, for we have learnt that it is possible to be aware of sensory mnemonic images to which we cannot possibly allow a psychical location in the systems *Cs.* or *Pcpt.*

We must, however, put off discussing this difficulty till we can focus our interest upon the system *Cs.* itself.<sup>3</sup> In the present connection we may be allowed to assume that hallucination consists in a cathexis of the system *Cs.* (*Pcpt.*), which, however, is not effected – as normally – from without, but from within, and that a necessary condition for the occurrence of hallucination is that regression shall be carried far enough to reach this system itself and in so doing be able to pass over reality-testing.<sup>4</sup>

In an earlier passage<sup>5</sup> we ascribed to the still helpless organism a capacity for making a first orientation in the world by means of its perceptions, distinguishing 'external' and 'internal' according to their relation to its muscular action. A perception which is made to disappear by an action is recognized as external, as reality; where such an action makes no difference, the perception originates within the subject's own body – it is not real. It is of value to the individual to possess a means

<sup>1</sup> [Chapter VII (B), *RSE*, 5, 476 ff.]

<sup>2</sup> [This bald assertion gives no hint of Freud's uncertainty regarding the topographical relationship between perception (*Pcpt.*) and consciousness (*Cs.*) in his earlier theoretical writings. See two Editors' footnotes to the 'Project' (1950a [1895]) for some indication of this: *ibid.*, 1, 313 n. 2 and 350 n. 4.]

<sup>3</sup> [Another probable reference to the missing paper on consciousness.]

<sup>4</sup> I may add by way of supplement that any attempt to explain hallucination would have to start out from *negative* rather than positive hallucination.

<sup>5</sup> 'Drives and their Vicissitudes' [p. 104 f. above].

such as this of recognizing reality,<sup>1</sup> which at the same time helps him to deal with it, and he would be glad to be equipped with a similar power [*Macht*]<sup>T</sup> against the often merciless claims of his *drives*. That is why he takes such pains to transpose outwards what becomes troublesome to him from within – that is, to *project* it.<sup>2</sup>

[233]

This function of orientating the individual in the world by discrimination between what is internal and what is external must now, after detailed dissection of the mental apparatus, be ascribed to the system Cs. (*Pcpt.*) alone. The Cs. must have at its disposal a motor innervation which determines whether the perception can be made to disappear or whether it proves resistant. Reality-testing need be nothing more than this contrivance.<sup>3</sup> We can say nothing more precise on this point, for we know too little as yet of the nature and mode of operation of the system Cs. We shall place reality-testing among the major *institutions of the ego*, alongside the *censorships* which we have come to recognize between the psychical systems, and we shall expect that the analysis of the narcissistic disorders will help to bring other similar institutions to light. [Cf. p. 221 below.]

On the other hand, we can already learn from pathology the way in which reality-testing may be done away with or put out of action. We shall see this more clearly in the wishful psychosis of amentia than in that of dreams. Amentia is the reaction to a loss which reality affirms, but which the ego has to deny [*verleugnet*]<sup>T</sup>, since it finds it insupportable. Thereupon the ego breaks off its relation to reality; it withdraws the cathexis from the system of perceptions, Cs. – or rather, perhaps, it withdraws a cathexis, the special nature of which may be the subject of further enquiry. With this turning away from reality, reality-testing is got rid of, the (unrepressed, completely conscious) wishful phantasies are able to press forward into the system, and they are there regarded as a better reality. Such a withdrawal may be put on a par with the processes of repression [*Verdrängungsvorgängen*]<sup>T</sup>. Amentia presents the interesting spectacle of a breach between the ego and one of its organs – one which

Verleugnung

<sup>1</sup> [In German: ‘*Kennzeichen der Realität*’. Cf. ‘*Realitätszeichen*’ (‘indications of reality’) in the ‘Project’ (1950a), Part I, Section 15, etc.; *RSE*, I, 350.]

<sup>2</sup> [Cf. the further discussion of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ in the much later paper on ‘Negation’ (1925b), *ibid.*, 19, 237 ff., and in Chapter I of *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930a), *ibid.*, 21, 59 ff.]

<sup>3</sup> Cf. a later passage on the distinction between testing with regard to reality and testing with regard to immediacy. [‘*Realitätsprüfung*’ and ‘*Aktualitätsprüfung*’. No reference to the latter seems to occur anywhere else; and this may be one more reference to a missing paper.]

had perhaps been its most faithful servant and had been bound up with it the most intimately.<sup>1</sup>

[234]

What is performed in amentia by this ‘repression’ is performed in dreams by voluntary renunciation. The state of sleep does not wish to know anything of the external world; it takes no interest in reality, or only so far as abandoning the state of sleep – waking up – is concerned. Hence it withdraws cathexis from the system *Cs.* as well as from the other systems, the *Pcs.* and the *Ucs.*, insofar as the cathexes<sup>2</sup> in them obey the wish to sleep. With the system *Cs.* thus uncathected, the possibility of reality-testing is abandoned; and the excitations which, independently of the state of sleep, have entered on the path of regression will find that path clear as far as the system *Cs.* where they will count as undisputed reality.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the hallucinatory psychosis of dementia praecox, we shall infer from our discussion that that psychosis cannot be among the initial symptoms of the affection. It becomes possible only when the patient’s ego is so far disintegrated that reality-testing no longer stands in the way of hallucination.

[235]

In what concerns the psychology of dream processes we arrive at the result that all the essential characteristics of dreams are determined by the conditioning factor of sleep. Aristotle was entirely right, long ago, in his modest pronouncement that dreams are the mental activity of the sleeper.<sup>4</sup> We might expand this and say: they are a residue of mental activity, made possible by the fact that the narcissistic state of sleep has not been able to be completely established. This does not sound very different from what psychologists and philosophers have said all along, but it is based on quite different views about the structure and function of the mental apparatus. These views have this advantage over the earlier

<sup>1</sup> I may venture to suggest in this connection that the toxic hallucinoses, too, e.g. alcoholic delirium, are to be understood in an analogous fashion. Here the unbearable loss imposed by reality would be precisely the loss of alcohol. When the latter is supplied, the hallucinations cease.

<sup>2</sup> [The German word here is ‘*Positionen*’, ‘military posts’. The use of the metaphor was no doubt suggested by the fact that ‘*Besetzung*’ (‘cathexis’) can itself be used in the sense of ‘military occupation’.]

<sup>3</sup> Here the principle of the insusceptibility to excitation of uncathected systems [cf. p. 201 above] appears to be set aside in the case of the system *Cs.* (*Pcpt.*). But it may be a question of only the *partial* removal of cathexis; and for the perceptual system especially we must assume many conditions for excitation which are widely divergent from those of other systems. – We are not, of course, intending to disguise or gloss over the uncertain and tentative character of these metapsychological discussions. Only deeper investigation can lead to the achievement of a certain degree of probability.

<sup>4</sup> [Quoted in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *RSE*, 4, 2.]

ones, that they have given us an understanding, too, of all the detailed characteristics of dreams.

Finally, let us once more glance at the significant light which the *topography* of the process of repression throws for us on the mechanism of mental disturbances. In dreams the withdrawal of cathexis (libido or interest) affects all systems equally; in the transference neuroses, the *Pcs.* cathexis is withdrawn; in schizophrenia, the cathexis of the *Ucs.*; in amentia, that of the *Cs.*

